Research summary: Social-benefit markets, such as those for carbon trading, are becoming increasingly popular for combating complex social and environmental problems. However, their unique characteristics pose substantial challenges to market creation and require novel entrepreneurial approaches. Integrating the entrepreneurship literature with that of management information systems, we conceptualize social-benefit markets as a new type of interorganizational arrangement and develop a model of social-benefit market creation. First, we argue a core entrepreneurial collective, comprising a plurality of actors from government, business and social movements, is essential. Second, we elaborate a six-phase process through This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
Accepted Article to increasing criticism (Hall et al., 2010) . Alternatively, collective social entrepreneurs may be uniquely positioned to address broad social challenges (Montgomery et al., 2012) . Collective entrepreneurship is key in cultural legitimation processes (Wry, Lounsbury and Glynn, 2011) and in bringing together diverse stakeholders to institutionalize new market categories (Khaire and Wadhwani, 2010) . Entrepreneurs working in collectives may have greater political influence and be better positioned to overcome barriers (Pinkse and Groot, 2013) . Collaboration between entrepreneurs can also increase the total pie available through positive externalities (Cohen and Winn, 2007; Sarasvathy, Dew, Velamuri et al., 2003) . For example, in industries ranging from green-tech and solar power to organic food, environmental entrepreneurs have been effective at leveraging resources across sectors (Meyskens and Carsrud, 2013; Pacheco et al., 2010) and collections of actors have been key to stimulating transformation around environmental concerns (Maguire et al., 2004; Wijen and Ansari, 2006) .
In sum, there is increasing convergence around the importance of collective environmental entrepreneurship particularly as it pertains to broad social change, such as that presented by social-benefit markets. Although the literature hints at a role for entrepreneurs in social-benefit market creation, research has not yet examined this role in detail, nor the processes and activities involved in the creation of such markets. For this reason, we turn to the MIS and IOS literatures, which provide relevant and novel insights into the processes of regrouping diverse actors into stable and successful interorganizational arrangements.
Interorganizational information systems
IOS are created when multiple organizations use common IS to coordinate activities, transact business or share knowledge in support of attaining individual and collective objectives (Lyytinen and Damsgaard, 2011) . IS development is not a purely technical exercise; rather, This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. Accepted Article technical elements (i.e., artifacts) must be jointly designed and optimized within the social and organizational contexts in which they will be used (IIvari, 1991) . The challenges of simultaneously developing organizational structures and technical artifacts are amplified during the creation of IOS spanning multiple organizational boundaries. This is because the creation of an IOS requires both individual and collective efforts to identify and align interests (Rodon, Pastor, Sesé et al., 2008) which will define the interorganizational arrangement (Finnegan, Galliers and Powell, 2003) .
Electronic markets, as a specific type of IOS, typically lack a primary owner and attract a larger number of participating suppliers (sellers) and customers (buyers) (Hu, Sun, Zhao et al., 2011) . Without a single organization to dictate the nature and adoption of the IOS, indirect methods of influence, negotiation and collaboration are required (Rodon et al., 2008) . Internal and external factors, such as the competitive environment, IOS objectives and the readiness of potential partners, influence the extent to which an organization engages in the IOS formation process (Chwelos, Benbasat and Dexter, 2001) . Organizations may use their position to influence IOS creation in line with their own goals and requirements (Bakos, 1991) , thus, the complexity of the formation processes increases with the number of participating organizations due to the need to align diverse goals, motivations and values (Rahim, Shanks, Johnston et al., 2007) .
Actor-Network Theory
Actor-Network Theory (ANT) (Callon and Latour, 1981) has provided valuable insights with respect to the processes underlying the creation of IOS. Adopting a socio-technical perspective, ANT views the actor-network as a collection of heterogeneous human and nonhuman (e.g., a technical artifact) actors with aligned interests jointly participating in a defined This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
Accepted Article collective undertaking (Pollack, Costello and Sankaran, 2013; Trkman and Trkman, 2014) . Key concepts associated with ANT are defined in Table 1. ---Insert Table 1 about here ---Within an actor-network, the network (e.g., the IOS) itself and all its actors (e.g., the participating organizations) have interests (e.g., goals or motivations), and the stability of the arrangement depends on the level of alignment between the interests of the actors and the network (Gao, 2007; Trkman and Trkman, 2014) . The interests of the network emerge from actors' interactions and negotiations during formative stages. Similarly, the interests of nonhuman actors arise initially from the interests of the other actors.
Two processes are critical to achieving a stable network: translation and inscription (Gao, 2007; Rodon et al., 2008) . Translation, achieved through iterative phases of problematization, interessement, enrollment, and mobilization (Table 1) , principally concerns the alignment of actors' interests (Callon and Latour, 1981) . Translation is also supported by inscription (Gasson, 2006) , or the embedding of different actors' interests into artifacts as they are designed, constructed, and used (Orlikowski and Iacono, 2001; Rodon et al., 2008) . To the extent that actors' interests are embedded in the artifact, they become the interests of the artifact. In this respect, the artifact is not neutral (D'Adderio, 2011), but carries certain values. Once developed and implemented, the artifact becomes a non-human actor (Callon and Latour, 1981; Pollack et al., 2013; Walsham and Sahay, 1999) , and may acquire material agency. Material agency refers to the capacity of artifacts to act independently of human action (Robey et al., 2012) . For example, a wide range of IS used by organizations today include software applications and automated processes that function with little or no human intervention. The technical artifact provides stability by guiding, constraining, monitoring and legitimizing various behaviors of its This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
Accepted Article users and the network in which it operates (D'Adderio, 2011; Robey et al., 2012) . For instance, if the collective interest is to foster control, the resulting artifact is likely to include strict levels of authorization and verification, which will subsequently constrain the behaviors of all future actors engaging with the system.
A Model of Social-Benefit Market Creation
Social benefit-markets differ from traditional markets in that they involve trading of public goods. Public goods include socially beneficial goods and services, such as national defense, lighthouses, and clean air and water. Unlike private goods, public goods (Samuelson, 1954) are both non-excludable, meaning non-paying individuals cannot be prevented from consuming them, and non-rivalrous, meaning use by one does not preclude use by others (e.g., Cornes and Sandler, 1986) . As such, public goods are vulnerable to free-riding effects and overuse, referred to as the 'tragedy of the commons' (Hardin, 1968) .
Public goods may also be both pure and impure (e.g., Kotchen, 2009 ). For example, household purchases of green electricity may include a pure public good -clean air -and an impure public good -the personal benefits derived from reduced household costs (Kotchen and Moore, 2007) , social approval or prestige (Cornes and Sandler, 1986; Kotchen, 2009) . It is the impure element of a public good that poses novel challenges for trading due to the lack of clearly defined property rights (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992) for these mostly intangible and fugitive goods. A potential solution to these problems is the development of an IOS (and related technical artifacts) that facilitates the creation and management of virtual property rights for public goods and sits at the core of a social-benefit market.
A plurality of entrepreneurial actors: core and periphery structure
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Based on extant literature, we posit that a single entrepreneur lacks the necessary skills, capabilities and credibility necessary for social-benefit market creation. Therefore, entrepreneurs must work within organized entrepreneurial collectives, comprising both individuals and organizations (e.g., Beveridge and Guy, 2005; Walsham and Sahay, 1999) , to recombine expertise (Vedres and Stark, 2010 ) and achieve a common objective. Two main factors underlie this argument: the diversity of required skills and resources and the need for legitimacy.
First, social-benefit market formation requires not only the traditional skills of entrepreneurs, including innovativeness, pro-activeness and risk-taking (Dai, Maksimov, Gilbert et al., 2014) , but also unique resources. Unique resources include public and legal resources under the purview of government, knowledge of the natural sciences held by a limited number of experts (Bansal et al., 2014; Elliot, 2011) , financial resources and technological platforms required to operate a new market (Fluker, 2014) and the ability to determine commensurability as standards and measurements are established (Samiolo, 2012) .
Second, the novelty, intangibility, cross-sectoral reach and unique market goals of socialbenefit markets may increase demands for legitimacy; in other words, to illustrate that actions are "…desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions" (Suchman, 1995, p. 574) . Emerging fields typically involve a heterogeneous network of actors and lack the stability of long-standing institutions. This places greater importance on characteristics of entrepreneurs which allow them to gain legitimacy and engage in activities to establish new social structures (Maguire et al., 2004) .
Although a plurality of diverse entrepreneurs is required for social-benefit market creation, it would be erroneous to view this as an unstructured collection of actors. Drawing on ANT's concepts of global and local networks (Law and Callon, 1992) and MIS research on the This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
Accepted Article interaction of core and periphery actors in development networks (e.g., Setia, Rajagopalan, Sambamurthy et al., 2012) , we suggest entrepreneurs in social-benefit market formation may be differentiated as either core or peripheral actors (Bakos, 1991; Giuliani, 2013) , as illustrated in Figure 1 .
---Insert Figure 1 about here ---
Core Entrepreneurial Actors
A core entrepreneurial collective (or local network, Table 1 ), comprises entrepreneurial actors mobilized to take action to achieve the desired outcome (Heeks and Stanforth, 2007) . For social-benefit market creation, we argue these actors must come from three main sectorsbusiness, government, and social movements -and each contributes unique resources, skills, experience and credibility. As the social-benefit market takes shape, these entrepreneurial actors are instrumentally and collectively involved in forming the interorganizational network which serves as the conduit for knowledge and communication (Giuliani, 2013) .
Business sector. Entrepreneurs from the business sector play an essential role in the core entrepreneurial collective by providing the financial capital, technological capabilities, resources and institutional rules for the efficient operations of markets, while also ensuring market liquidity through the provision of secure, real-time information to participants (Lee and Clark, 1996) . Different types of business organizations may become involved, including potential market participants (e.g., buyers and sellers), information intermediaries (e.g., technology companies) (Frankhauser and Hepburn, 2010) , and financial intermediaries (e.g., banks) (Ellerman, Convery and Perthuis, 2010) , each of which offers a distinct contribution to market formation processes (Bakos, 1991) . In addition to these operational skills and resources, the involvement of the business sector enhances the credibility of the new market.
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Government: Governments can play both entrepreneurial and obstructionist roles in new market formation. In some cases, government may resist change by favoring incumbents during periods of institutional transitions (Peng, 2003) , such as supporting fossil fuel companies (Pinkse and Groot, 2013) . Alternatively, government may support market creation by using regulator powers to reduce uncertainty and ambiguity (Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009 ) and by providing the necessary structures to establish market stability (Fligstein, 2001) . By using policy measures, such as tax incentives or environmental protection legislation, governments can encourage positive environmental entrepreneurial activities while discouraging detrimental activities (Dean and McMullen, 2007) . Regulatory oversight can also create liquidity and transparency in carbon markets (Fluker, 2014) , while a lack of government support may contribute to lack of legitimacy, regulatory structure and, ultimately, market failures (Sandor, 2012) .
Social movements. The necessity of social movements' involvement in the core entrepreneurial collective stems from the unique social and environmental dimensions of socialbenefit markets. Social movements are collective endeavors organized to solve social problems whose influence occurs through complex and multi-directional relationships (Rao, Morrill and Zald, 2000) . Social movements drive change by challenging elites, power structures, norms and values (Hoffman, 1999) ; creating market demand for new products or industries that are more favorable to their particular concern, such as the environment (e.g., Hiatt, Sine and Tolbert, 2009 ); and working collaboratively as members of a market or field (Lounsbury, Ventresca and Hirsch, 2003) to shape consciousness and attitudes (Zald, Morrill and Rao, 2005) . With respect to social-benefit markets, we argue that social movements play each of these roles to some extent, modifying both the costs and benefits of a decision to engage in social-benefit market creation by shaping legitimacy (Georgallis, 2016) . Legitimacy facilitates relationship building, This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
Accepted Article through the conversion of antagonistic parties and co-creating acceptable norms with key stakeholders (Basu and Palazzo, 2008) . In the core entrepreneurial collective, social movements create awareness around the issue to be addressed, push for new structures to address these challenges, and collaborate with other entrepreneurial actors to develop those structures.
The market as a non-human actor. Although human actors representing the three sectors comprise the core entrepreneurial collective during the early stages of social-benefit market formation, as we will explain, they are joined during the later stages by an emerging non-human actor, the market artifact. Through the various translation processes, the market artifact is inscribed with the values and interests of the founding actors. As the artifact becomes more defined, it is able to stand apart from the human actors and serves to define, promote and stabilize the network.
Peripheral Actors
Outside of the core, peripheral actors in the global network provide some of the required resources including money, expertise and political support (Heeks and Stanforth, 2007) , but are not actively engaged in market formation processes. Peripheral actors may wish to partake in market activities and their eventual participation in the market will impact the market's popularization (Setia et al., 2012) and long-term stability (Heeks and Stanforth, 2007) . Although it is theoretically useful to differentiate between the core entrepreneurial collective and the periphery actors, this distinction is fluid and evolving as actors transition between roles (Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006) during the market-creation process.
Market creation: Aligning and inscribing interests through entrepreneurial actions
Six main phases define the social-benefit market creation process (summarized in Table   2 ), beginning with joint problem recognition and concluding with entrepreneurial transference. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
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Phase 1: Joint Problem Recognition
Opportunity recognition, the ability of an entrepreneur to actively discover and evaluate opportunities (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000) , is a key contribution of the entrepreneur in new venture creation (Corbett and Katz, 2012) . Typically, models of entrepreneurship group together problem and solution recognition as part of opportunity recognition (e.g., Bhave, 1994) .
However, these represent two separate phases in our model based on theoretical reasoning: not only is the outcome of each activity distinct, but the dynamics within the core collective and periphery are also different. Accordingly, we argue the process of social-benefit market creation begins when various actors within the global network begin to recognize the presence of a broad social or environmental challenge with implications beyond any particular actor. We believe this last distinction is important. Many entrepreneurs are able to identify threats or problems with potential impacts on their own interests. However, level of harm, immediate threat, personal and organizational filters, and timing of the common problem will influence whether and when actors identify problems that are more global in nature. For example, efforts to combat climate change have been thwarted by naysayers who denied or downplayed the importance of human-induced climatic changes (Sheppard, 2012) .
A number of entrepreneurial activities take place during this phase. In particular, actors are likely to engage in environmental scanning (Standing, Stockdale and Love, 2010) .
Awareness-building and education around critical social and environmental issues is essential because consciousness must exist before meaningful change can occur (Watson, Corbett, Boudreau et al., 2012) . In addition, understanding underlying problems is a precursor to designing and developing complex IOS solutions (Ghosh, 2011) . Joint problem recognition This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
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Actors independently begin to recognize and internalize concerns impacting their own interests and those of society, but have not yet made decisions about how, or whether, to proceed. In this regard, actors engaging in joint problem recognition are 'entrepreneurs-in-waiting'.
Phase 2: Joint Solution Design
Once a number of actors have identified a joint problem, social-benefit market creation moves into the second phase: joint solution design. During this phase, the concept of a socialbenefit market emerges as a leading potential solution. Activities during this phase continue to occur in the global network, and certain actors, who we call entrepreneur-actors, begin to assume leading roles. Entrepreneur-actors seek to identify "situations in which new goods, services, raw materials, markets and organizing methods can be introduced through the formation of new means, ends, or means-ends relationships" (Eckhardt and Shane, 2003, p. 336) .
With a focus on solution design, various entrepreneurial capabilities come to the forefront, including alertness, cognitive and personality factors, social networks, prior experience and knowledge about resource requirements and market needs Phillips and Tracey, 2007; Shane and Venkataraman, 2000) . In addition, a number of activities facilitating collaboration around joint solution design take place. For instance, entrepreneuractors may initiate a requirements elicitation process to clarify expectations across stakeholders (Ghosh, 2011) . Cost-benefit analyses (Rahim et al., 2007; Rahim, Shanks and Johnston, 2011) may be conducted with the understanding that a successful IOS must provide both long-term private and collective benefits (Sigala, 2013) . Considering these activities, joint solution design differs from traditional opportunity recognition because entrepreneur-actors acknowledge that the solution lies beyond the scope of any individual actor.
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Having explored a range of potential joint solutions, entrepreneur-actors realize that they cannot 'go it alone' and instead require deeper engagement and collaboration with other sectors (Dean and McMullen, 2007) . Entrepreneur-actors begin to identify one another and loose boundaries emerge around a core collective. Based on the previous discussion regarding the plurality of actors, we suggest that without the support, at least in principle, from each of government, business and social movements, the creation of a social-benefit market is unlikely to progress beyond this phase.
Phase 3: Interessement of the Collective
Interessement occurs when certain actors attempt to interest other actors in the proposed solution (Callon, 1986; Rodon et al., 2008) and is particularly relevant during complex and large-scale interorganizational arrangements. During this third phase, entrepreneur-actors are motivated to form relationships across organizational and sectoral boundaries in order to gain access to the resources necessary for building the proposed solution, in this case, the socialbenefit market. Generating broad interest is vital because resistance or lack of commitment to an IOS may destabilize the project and lead to later implementation challenges (Fairchild, Ribbers and Nooteboom, 2004; Lee and Clark, 1996) .
The success of an IOS depends on the ability of actors to build a strong local network (e.g. the core entrepreneurial collective) and to maintain a global network (Heeks and Stanforth, 2007) that is willing to provide resources and support. At first, interessement focuses on bringing greater cohesion to the core collective because entrepreneur-actors will be more engaged when they have a deeper understanding of the venture (Rodon et al., 2008) . One entrepreneur-actor may take an early lead in activities driving collaboration or all may work in unison, engaging in interessement activities that include benefit identification, articulation and alignment (Boonstra, This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
Accepted Article Boddy and Bell, 2008; Sigala, 2013) ; influencing and marketing of the concept (Rahim et al., 2007; Rahim et al., 2011) ; and acts of framing to create interest and inspire activities (Benford and Snow, 2000) . Interessement acts as an exogenous trigger (Bhave, 1994) for peripheral actors, prompting them to learn more about the proposed solution, and cohesion effects (Giuliani, 2013) and may lead some to join the core entrepreneurial collective. Meanwhile, others may elect to wait in the periphery, discount the opportunity, or create a competing network (Gao, 2007) .
Two main outcomes are achieved in this phase. First, the vision of the social-benefit market is outlined in greater detail through a sequence of interactions and multi-lateral negotiations between actors (Finnegan et al., 2003; Rodon et al., 2008) . Here, the interests of the entrepreneur-actors begin to become inscribed within the emerging market artifact. Second, the boundaries around the core entrepreneurial collective become more clearly delineated and fixed.
All three sectors -government, business and social movements -are represented, each having acknowledged their support and involvement through informal or formal expressions of interest, offering proof of commitment and legitimacy for the collective.
Phase 4: Resource Pooling
During the fourth phase, resource pooling, entrepreneur-actors turn their attention to implementation of the solution, seeking to create durable and irreversible relations (Rodon et al., 2008) and assemble the resources and expertise necessary for the social-benefit market.
Mobilization of resources drives actors to a higher level of attachment and investment in the proposed solution, while the creation of durable and irreversible relations may protect the collective against potential free-rider problems (Volkoff, Chan and Newson, 1999) .
Each actor in the core entrepreneurial collective contributes unique resources during this phase. The business sector provides financial and technical resources (Bakos, 1991; Lee and This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
Accepted Article Clark, 1996) ; government provides necessary regulative structures (Dean and McMullen, 2007; Fligstein, 2001) ; and social movements provide moral legitimacy and the ability to shape public attitudes (Basu and Palazzo, 2008) . In addition, entrepreneur-actors may enroll peripheral actors to supply additional skills and resources (Heeks and Stanforth, 2007; Setia et al., 2012) .
Combining these varied resources requires a high degree of coordination (Volkoff et al., 1999) , enabled by organizational improvisation (Crossan, Pina e Cunha, Vera et al., 2005) and bricolage (Corbett and Katz, 2012; Phillips and Tracey, 2007) . Organizational improvisation, or the ability to deal with unexpected occurrences (Magni, Proserpio, Hoegl et al., 2009) , is an important activity as it provides flexibility in complex system design projects. Through bricolage entrepreneurs apply "combinations of the resources at hand to new problems and opportunities" (Baker and Nelson, 2005, p. 333) , using resources in novel ways to establish new ventures where no apparent opportunity exists (Phillips and Tracey, 2007) .
Throughout this phase, the boundary between the core and periphery is clearly defined, but still fluid as actors continue to negotiate roles and align interests (Giuliani, 2013) . Creating and sharing resources and ideas, including an organizing vision, are important factors in building trust necessary for stable interorganizational arrangements (Boonstra et al., 2008; Lyytinen and Damsgaard, 2011) and are important activities during the resource pooling phase. Other activities include collecting and managing data and formulating policies to instill a collaborative mindset (Sigala, 2013) , setting formal commitments, establishing implementation plans and crossorganizational teams (Lu, Huang and Heng, 2006; Rahim et al., 2011) and developing joint management practices (Sigala, 2013) . Through these activities, resources are assembled clearing the way for the creation of a market artifact.
Phase 5: Market Artifact Creation
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A key phase of all entrepreneurial ventures is technology and organizational set up, during which entrepreneurs review, create, or modify organizational structures to support the new venture (Bhave, 1994) . For social-benefit markets, we propose these activities take place within the fifth phase, market artifact creation. The market artifact consists of an IS (including hardware software, data, procedures, and related technological and material elements) that supports the interorganizational arrangement, brings tangible property rights to an otherwise intangible public good and allows for various business and social objectives to be achieved.
Inscription, whereby an actor's interests become embodied into artifacts, such as texts or software (D'Adderio, 2011; Rodon et al., 2008) , is a principal activity in the fifth phase.
Inscription occurs as actors make investments in hardware, software, user training and organizational changes (Bakos, 1991) necessary to support the social-benefit market. Activities may also include interorganizational process engineering (Lee and Clark, 1996) , the development of shared standards (Lu et al., 2006) and the translation of business needs into technical requirements (Volkoff et al., 1999) and system designs. Inscription of a market artifact contributes to successful social-benefit market formation by creating greater cohesion, triggering the initiation of trading, and allowing actors to achieve the expected benefits of participation (Standing et al., 2010) . Inscription is essential because characteristics of the market artifact dictate the attractiveness of the market and influence the level of participation of peripheral actors. For example, a carbon market whose structures lead to little or inactive trading (i.e., thin markets) will have more difficulty surviving (Fluker, 2014).
During inscription processes, the value of a plurality of entrepreneur-actors is again apparent. Representatives of the business sector, for instance, are able to leverage their financial resources and technological expertise to provide market infrastructure, such as trading and This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
Accepted Article communications platforms. At the same time, government, supported by social movements and business partners, can define policies and regulations that offer market structure. When fully inscribed with the interests of the entrepreneur-actors, the market artifact takes on the role of a non-human actor within the core entrepreneurial collective. At this stage, it acquires material agency and is able to operate independently of the entrepreneur-actors and guides, constrains, and monitors, market operations and activities of all market participants. This phase concludes when the market artifact is fully inscribed and the market is ready for trading.
Phase 6: Entrepreneurial Transference
The final phase of social-benefit market creation involves 'going live'; in other words, when the first trades are transacted (Bhave, 1994) . Ceremonial first transactions may be arranged to give credence and legitimacy to the new venture as well as to educate potential participants. In conjunction with a shift in priority from creating to growing the social-benefit market, changes continue to occur within the global network and the core entrepreneurial collective. Notably, the core entrepreneurial collective, having substantially achieved its objective, may begin to dissolve. Members of the core entrepreneurial collective may choose to leave or diminish their active role (Fluker, 2014) , allowing the market artifact to take on the central coordinating role by providing the platform and mechanisms that allow for its diffusion and operation.
In this final stage, peripheral actors also take on increased importance, as they do for instance in the diffusion and continuation of open source software development after the initial version is released (Setia et al., 2012) . Likewise, as some of the original social-benefit market entrepreneur-actors leave the core collective, peripheral actors who had adopted a 'wait and see' approach may become more engaged. Ultimately, the success of collective entrepreneurial This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
Accepted Article activities will be evaluated by the attractiveness of the market to peripheral actors, the strength of initial trading and the depth and commitment of the global network (Heeks and Stanforth, 2007) . Both jurisdictions delegated responsibility to WCI Inc. for administrative and technical services, including the development and management of the electronic market, oversight of auctions and sales of emission units. The WCI's carbon market is second only to the European EU-ETS in terms of total emissions under jurisdiction (EDF, 2015b) .
The Western Climate
In this section, we trace the history of the Western Climate Initiative's (WCI) carbon markets. Our intention here is not to provide a rigorous empirical evaluation of the proposed theory, but to illustrate how it can be used to understand social-benefit market creation (Sarasvathy, Kumar, York et al., 2014) .
A plurality of entrepreneurs
The WCI experience demonstrates the importance of a plurality of entrepreneur-actors. First, the WCI has provincial or state governments as key players and is supported by legislated carbon emission targets that monitor and enforce compliance. Government involvement provided structure to the social-benefit market concept in the respective regions. Social movements and the business sector were also essential to the WCI's formation. In California, two advisory boards were formally written into the market's founding legislation. These boards include representatives of immigrant communities, poverty activists, health and safety advocates, environmental groups, and industry and academic experts (CEPA, 2013) . In Quebec, the involvement and vocal support of prominent environmental groups, such as Equiterre, and key members of the business community similarly added legitimacy to the carbon market concept.
Market formation processes and entrepreneurial actions
Efforts leading to the creation of the WCI carbon markets can be observed as far back as the early 1990s. During these very early phases of market formation, some actors within the global network began to recognize the joint problem of climate change and seek solutions. (Hashmi, 2010) .
More than a decade after the joint problem was recognized, the WCI carbon market were on the horizon. In California, the advocacy group E2 conducted a public and government relations campaign pushing for support for GHG legislation using statistical evidence of climate change as well as financial analyses to demonstrate the benefits to the California economy (E2, 2006) . The group eventually claimed to have the support of a "significant portion of the This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
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California business community" (E2, 2006, p. 2) as well as legislators and senators.
These interessement activities helped to solidify the core entrepreneurial collectives in both jurisdictions and provided more precision around the parameters of the emerging carbon market. With the idea gaining momentum, entrepreneur-actors turned their attention to resource pooling to assemble the resources necessary to bring the market to fruition. In California, support and resources were assembled from across a diverse set of actors which included "strong environmental advocates, Latino caucus, business Democrats, and moderate Republicans" ( To these ends, the governments of California and Quebec continued to seek out new partners to join the WCI carbon market (Temesco and Doan, 2014) demonstrating the iterative and ongoing nature of collective entrepreneurial actions in social-benefit market formation.
Discussion and Conclusion
Social-benefit markets offer a promising strategy for addressing serious social and environmental problems. However, these markets present a variety of challenges in terms of the scope of the problems they seek to address, the political and social divides they seek to bridge and the technical demands of what they measure and trade (e.g., Bansal et al., 2014; Espeland and Stevens, 1998; Kolk et al., 2008; Samiolo, 2012) . The aim of this paper is to enhance knowledge in this area by offering a model of social-benefit market creation, which has both commonalities and distinctions with traditional entrepreneurial undertakings. In particular, the complexities of social-benefit market formation demand collective action and the recombination of unique skills and resources, leading to the creation of a stable market artifact inscribed with the interests of a plurality of entrepreneur-actors.
Although carbon markets are at the forefront of efforts to use market mechanisms for social and environmental benefit, we believe our model is applicable to other types of socialbenefit markets. For example, in light of a growing global water crisis, water markets, such as This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
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Australia's Murray-Darling Basin, although controversial, are gaining increased attention as a strategy for distributing scarce resources and protecting human and ecosystem users. We suggest our model would also apply to this and other markets in public goods where those goods are intangible, fugitive and lack clear property rights. On the other hand, the model is also highly bounded and a result, it may not apply to other market innovations that draw heavily on both entrepreneurial action and IOS, such as crowdsourcing and the sharing economy, because they primarily concern traditional private goods, even though they may offer some positive externalities or social benefits. As such, we would not deem them to be social-benefit markets.
Contributions
This work makes several contributions to research and practice. First, we expand prior literature on the important role of entrepreneurs in market creation (e.g., Navis and Glynn, 2010; Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009 ) by focusing on a new form of market that relies on environmental entrepreneurs specifically for their unique skills and knowledge. In so doing, we examine more deeply the creation of the market artifact itself and introduce the MIS literature to the entrepreneurship domain, allowing us to develop a novel conceptual model at the intersection of these two domains. Although prior research has noted that action lies at the heart of many definitions of entrepreneurship, our knowledge around these activities remains limited (Corbett and Katz, 2012) . Our model addresses this limitation by detailing how social-benefit markets are created and how entrepreneur-actors integrate capabilities and resources in the activities of market creation. To our knowledge, the IOS perspective has not previously been applied to entrepreneurship. Its integration here provides our model with a solid theoretical foundation for understanding interactions and activities within heterogeneous interorganizational arrangements.
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Second, we address calls to enrich the understanding of the entrepreneur's role in collective efforts and actions (Cohen and Winn, 2007; Sarasvathy et al., 2003) especially in the context of broad-based change (Maguire et al., 2004; Montgomery et al., 2012; Wijen and Ansari, 2006) . In doing so, we extend emerging literature suggesting 'heroic' entrepreneurs are unlikely to execute complex change efforts alone (Hall et al., 2010) . Instead, we argue collectives of environmental entrepreneurs are required to solve broad environmental challenges.
We acknowledge that such collective actions and efforts, while desirable, are challenging, and we offer new insights by theorizing the specific processes entrepreneurs undertake to establish effective collectives. Further, our work extends prior scholarship regarding subject positions (Maguire et al., 2004) by identifying the importance of core and peripheral actors in socialbenefit market creation and collective entrepreneurial activities more generally.
Two notable contributions are also made to the MIS field. First, the paper responds to calls to expand the study of IOS beyond the actions of individual organizations (Lyytinen and Damsgaard, 2011) . By incorporating perspectives from entrepreneurship, we approach the phenomenon of IOS from a new angle, highlighting the important, but as yet under-examined, role entrepreneurs play in IOS creation. Second, our work contributes to a growing literature on Green IS which is concerned with the role of information systems in the context of environmental sustainability. The MIS field has come to realize that the wise use of IS can play a major role in advancing environmental sustainability (Watson et al., 2012) , but doing so requires stepping outside the bounds of the discipline (Elliot, 2011) . As our paper suggests, IOS that provide efficient mechanisms for social-benefit trading can be part of the sustainability solution.
Our model provides a new trans-disciplinary perspective on how these types of systems are created and can serve as a launching point for further research.
Finally, for practice, our model may serve as a guide for environmental entrepreneurs by challenging conventional wisdom and highlighting key phases and activities involved in successful social-benefit market creation. For example, critics suggest the role of government and movements has been ignored in many jurisdictions in the belief that business alone can address such problems. Our work recognizes government and activist involvement not only as a positive influence, but also as a necessity for successful social-benefit market creation.
Limitations and Future Research Directions
In developing a model of social-benefit market formation, we have chosen to integrate ideas from the environmental entrepreneurship and MIS literatures. This choice has led us down a path which brings to the fore a number of novel theoretical insights. However, we acknowledge this is only one plausible explanation. Scholars adopting institutional theory or economic behavioral perspectives may arrive at different and equally plausible explanations. This diversity, rather than diminishing the value of this work, highlights the complexity of the social-benefit market phenomenon and we encourage researchers to explore other perspectives that may supplement and refine the model we have presented. Second, our choice of literatures also means that our paper takes a relatively positive view in emphasizing the benefits of a stable network in which interests are aligned. We have not delved into literature which considers how networks are embedded in socio-cultural structures that also present constraints (Dacin, Ventresca and Beal, 1999) . Future research might consider how actors in the core and periphery use networks to gain or expand power (Fligstein and McAdam, 2011) or as a source of information or collusion (Powell, White, Koput et al., 2005) .
Third, although we have used the case of the WCI to illustrate the model, the theory remains untested. We suggest future empirical research could take the form of in-depth case studies, as well as real-time, longitudinal ethnographic studies of currently developing markets.
In addition, research could test the model in the context of other social-benefit markets as a means of further refining the boundary conditions of the theory. Fourth, our model does not extend beyond the market creation stage. Indeed, while market creation is challenging, anecdotal evidence suggests that ongoing market liquidity, continued buy-in and long-term survival are also major concerns (e.g., Ellerman et al., 2010; Sandor, 2012) . Certainly, the successful creation but later failure of the CCX provides one stark example of how changes in the socio-cultural context -President George Bush's election, a significant recession, and the 9/11 terror attacks -can lead to a misalignment of interests between the market artifact and entrepreneurial-actors. Research drawing on work in entrepreneurship and interorganizational network survival will deepen our understanding of these challenges and potential counteractions.
Finally, the model presented here focuses on the processes involved in the creation of a single social-benefit model. We can speculate the model would apply in more complex situations, but we do not explicitly address the particularities associated with global federatedtype markets. As the concept of linked or global carbon markets (Gilbert, 2009) continues to be discussed, it may be interesting to extend the model to include factors such as the political, social, and cultural contexts between different regions (Meek, Pacheco and York, 2010) that influence the success of entrepreneurial collectives.
Highly complex global social and environmental challenges demand innovative solutions.
Social-benefit markets represent a promising innovation, but their creation is not a trivial process. Through purposeful collaboration of actors across sectors, entrepreneurs may have the best odds for achieving meaningful social and environmental improvements.
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Sh haded area = no This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. (Walsham and Sahay, 1999) Actor-network Heterogeneous network of aligned interests, including, people, organizations and artifacts (Walsham and Sahay, 1999) Translation Process whereby the different actors' interests, meanings and values are aligned, thus developing and stabilizing the network (Callon, 1986; Rodon et al., 2008) Problematization One of the stages of translation, problematization occurs when an actor identifies a problem or opportunity and attempts to bring this awareness to other actors who may want to participate in the network (Callon, 1986; Rodon et al., 2008) Interessement One of the stages of translation, interessement involves the attempts of actors to interest other actors in the proposed solution. (Callon, 1986; Rodon et al., 2008) Enrollment Multilateral negotiations and interactions that accompany interessement and enable the creation of a group of allied actors (Rodon et al., 2008; Walsham and Sahay, 1999) 
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Mobilization
Final stage of translation, mobilization occurs when actors within the network seek to create durable and irreversible relations by taking actions that result in reinforcing the cohesive whole (Callon and Latour, 1981; Rodon et al., 2008) .
Inscription
The process whereby translations of one's interests get embodied into artifacts (e.g., text, software) (Rodon et al., 2008) Irreversibility The degree to which it is subsequently impossible to go back to a point where alternative possibilities exist (Walsham and Sahay, 1999) Global network The network "that is built up, deliberately or otherwise, and that generates a space, a period of time, and a set of resources in which innovation takes place" (Law and Callon, 1992, p. 21) . Resources outside the projects, which may include money, expertise and political support (Heeks and Stanforth, 2007) .
Local network
The set of relations "necessary to the successful production of any working device" (Law and Callon, 1992, p. 22) . Resources inside the project actually involved in implementing the project (Heeks and Stanforth, 2007) . 
Resource pooling
Resources necessary for the creation of the socialbenefit market are identified and assembled; initial structure of market emerges
Mobilization of resources through bricolage and improvisation; creating shared vision, social capital; assembling implementation teams, establishing management practices Social-benefit market begins to emerge as a non-human actor within the core entrepreneurial collective
Market artifact creation
Social-benefit market fully inscribed with entrepreneur-actors interests and operational ready Inscription of market artifact through reengineering business processes, developing technical requirements, programming, and systems integration Inscribed with interests of core entrepreneurial collective, the social-benefit market assumes a greater role in the core entrepreneurial collective.
Entrepreneurial transference
Stable operational and sustainable social-benefit market
Trading among market participants
Core collective begins to dissolves as market artifact assumes responsibility for operations
